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Abstract
If Canadian refugee policy is to serve interests of Canadians 
as well as those of genuine refugees in an eff ective manner, 
far more radical changes will be needed than have been 
attempted to date. Th ey must include the introduction 
of robust safe third country designations, a review of the 
1985 Singh decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, and 
possible withdrawal by Canada of its accession to the 1951 
UN Refugee Convention. Other measures should also be 
considered such as placing an annual limit on the intake of 
refugees from overseas combined with that of successful in-
country asylum seekers as well as establishing provision for 
temporary refugee status in Canada in addition to perma-
nent resettlement. Measures should be taken to return 
Canada to its role primarily as a resettlement country for 
refugees selected abroad and not one that accommodates 
large numbers of asylum seekers making claims on our ter-
ritory. With strong public backing for major changes, pol-
itical parties that oppose such reforms will do so at the risk 
of losing electoral support.
Résumé
Si la politique envers les réfugiés au Canada doit servir 
les intérêts des Canadiens ainsi que ceux des réfugiés de 
bonne foi d’une manière effi  cace, des changements bien 
plus radicaux seront nécessaires que ceux qui ont été tentés 
jusqu’ici. Ces changements doivent comprendre l’introduc-
tion de désignations robustes de pays tiers sûrs, un examen 
de la décision Singh de la Cour suprême du Canada de 
1985 et le retrait éventuel par le Canada de son adhésion à 
la Convention du 28 juillet 1951 relative au statut des réfu-
giés de l’ONU. D’autres mesures devraient également être 
considérées comme la mise en place d’un plafond annuel à 
l’accueil des réfugiés d’outre-mer combiné à l’acceptation 
de demandes d’asile sur le territoire ainsi que l’établisse-
ment de dispositions pour le statut de réfugié temporaire 
au Canada et la réinstallation permanente. Des mesures 
devraient être prises pour permettre au Canada de retrou-
ver son rôle comme pays avant tout de réinstallation pour 
les réfugiés sélectionnés à l’étranger et non pas comme 
pays accueillant un grand nombre de demandeurs d’asile 
faisant des réclamations sur son territoire. Compte tenu de 
l’appui soutenu du public pour des changements majeurs, 
les partis politiques qui s’opposent à ces réformes le font au 
risque de perdre leur soutien électoral.
Introduction
Th e year 2010 saw major activity on the part of the 
Government of Canada in terms of presenting legisla-
tion designed to deal with perceived shortcomings of the 
refugee determination system. Early in the year a bill was 
tabled in Parliament to address sharp rises in refugee 
claims by nationals of countries that would not normally 
be considered as refugee-producing. In the years preced-
ing the tabling of the bill there had been concern over the 
large number of claims by asylum seekers from the Czech 
Republic and Mexico. Th e case made by refugee claimants 
from Mexico was usually that they were fl eeing violence 
precipitated by drug cartels, while the Czechs were from 
the Roma (Gypsy) minority and cited the widespread dis-
crimination they encountered in their homeland.
While both groups of claimants had reason to believe 
they would be better off  in Canada, the Government did 
not consider that the reasons they advanced in support of 
their applications for protection constituted convincing 
cases of persecution as required by the 1951 United Nations 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. With regard 
to Mexican claimants, fl eeing criminal violence was not 
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regarded as being equivalent to suff ering from persecution 
as stipulated by the Convention, and if this kind of problem 
were accepted as grounds for being granted asylum, there 
were undoubtedly millions more around the world entitled 
to come here as refugees.
As for the Roma from the Czech Republic, suff ering from 
discrimination was not considered equivalent to govern-
ment persecution. It did not help their case that Roma from 
the Czech Republic were free to travel to any other member 
country of the European Union, none of which would con-
sider a refugee claim from a Czech citizen.
An indication of the extent to which Canada was out of 
line with other countries in considering claims from the 
nationals of these two nations is that according to UNHCR 
statistics no other nation granted refugee status to a Czech 
in 2008 and only Canada and the United States did so in the 
case of Mexicans—with Canada accepting far more than 
the US.1
Eff orts to Make the Refugee Determination System 
More Effi  cient
Th e Government accordingly tabled legislation designed 
to deal with large increases in arrivals of asylum seekers as 
well as measures to introduce more effi  ciency and fairness 
to what is widely regarded as a largely dysfunctional refu-
gee determination system. Th e bill presented to Parliament 
was aimed at speeding up the processing and disposition of 
both applications that appeared to have little merit as well 
as those that were well-founded and stood a good chance of 
being approved.
A specifi c objective of the legislation was to deny the 
opportunity for in-Canada appeals to claimants from non-
refugee producing countries. Th e purpose of this was to 
avoid situations where such unsuccessful claimants could 
remain here while their appeals wound their way through 
the system and thereby increase their chances of remaining 
here indefi nitely by one means or another. Other countries, 
such as the United Kingdom, require that appeals from such 
refused claimants be pursued from abroad if they wish to do 
so in order that they don’t gain advantage from prolonging 
their stay in Britain.
Included in the legislation package was the creation of 
a Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (IRB), a unit that had been provided for in 
the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). 
Successive Liberal and Conservative immigration minis-
ters had refused, however, to implement this section of the 
Act since in their estimation there were already too many 
opportunities for refugee claimants turned down by the 
IRB to have their cases appealed or reviewed. Until this was 
sorted out, it was viewed as unwise to add yet another level 
of appeal.2
In consequence, in the bill presented in early 2010, the 
Government included provision for the establishment of 
the RAD in combination with changes to the system that 
would consolidate the existing opportunities to have failed 
cases appealed and reviewed. If all the elements of the bill 
were approved, it was, therefore, expected to bring about 
an overall improvement of the system in terms of effi  ciency 
and timely disposition of claims.
In the event, however, refugee lawyers and activists as 
well as members of opposition parties in Parliament were 
successful in retaining inclusion of the RAD while dilut-
ing other parts of the legislation. It remains to be seen, in 
the circumstances, whether the Balanced Refuge Reform 
Act passed in June will be an improvement on the current 
system. Immigration expert James Bissett, for one, believes 
it likely that the provisions of the new legislation will create 
even more backlogs.3
Arrival of the Sun Sea
Later in 2010 the Government again tried to introduce 
reforms with the tabling of a bill designed to curb human 
smuggling following the arrival of a boatload of 492 Tamil 
asylum seekers in August on a vessel named the Sun Sea. 
While Canadian authorities had known for weeks that 
the Sun Sea was headed in this direction from Asia, the 
Government felt it had no choice but to allow it to land in 
Canada and permit those on board to claim refugee status. 
Its arrival raised questions about the extent to which we are 
able to control who enters our territory and, by implication, 
the degree to which we are able to protect our sovereignty.
Public Opinion Supports Strong Measures to 
Prevent Human Smuggling
Public opinion is clearly in support of taking a fi rm line on 
how we should deal with such incidents. A Leger Marketing 
poll4 released aft er the arrival of the Sun Sea found that 60 
per cent of those surveyed thought the ship and its passen-
gers should be turned away and escorted back to Sri Lanka 
by the Canadian Navy. According to an Angus Reid poll5 
taken at about the same time, almost half of those surveyed 
felt that, even if the refugee claims of those who arrived 
on the Sun Sea were found to be legitimate and no links 
were made between them and any terrorist organization, 
the ship’s crew and passengers should still be sent back to 
Sri Lanka. While it should not be concluded from this that 
Canadians are unsympathetic towards the plight of refugees 
in general, these survey results clearly refl ect a high level of 
frustration on the part of Canadians with regard to what 
they perceive as abuse of the system.
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Th ere is fairly broad agreement among political parties 
that the bill should provide heavy fi nes and sentences for 
those who organize the voyages as well as major penalties for 
the owners and operators of the ships involved. Th e sections 
being challenged by opposition parties in Parliament are 
those aimed at deterring asylum seekers themselves from 
using the services of human smugglers to get to Canada.
Th e bill if approved by Parliament would stipulate that 
asylum seekers who reach Canadian shores in such mass 
arrivals would be detained for up to a year in order to deter-
mine their identity, admissibility, and whether they were 
involved in illegal activity. Th ey would, furthermore, be 
barred from applying for permanent resident status for fi ve 
years even if they were granted refugee status, and would 
not be able to sponsor family members for fi ve years. In 
addition they would lose their status if they went back for 
visits to the country from which they sought refuge or if the 
situation there improved to the point where it was safe for 
them to return.
Notwithstanding the strong indications noted above that 
public opinion supports a fi rm stance on refugee claimants 
using human smugglers to enter Canada, refugee advocates 
and opposition members in Parliament have taken the 
position that the asylum seekers should be considered as 
victims of the human smugglers. Th ey should not be con-
sidered as complicit in a criminal operation given that they 
may have had no other means of reaching Canada to make 
a refugee claim. In the view of refugee advocates, the bill 
would, moreover, create a two-tier system in which asylum 
seekers arriving as part of a “designated human smuggling 
event” are treated unfairly in comparison with those who 
get here by others means and are, therefore, not subject to 
such harsh rules.
While there is some merit in the claim that asylum seek-
ers using human smugglers to get here will be treated more 
sternly than those who don’t, it is not unreasonable to ask 
whether some of the tougher rules should not be applied 
to refugee claimants in general. It is diffi  cult to see, for 
example, why any asylum seeker should be able to pursue 
their claim if they have no problem with going back to visit 
the countries from which they said they had to fl ee.6 Th e 
Government, in fact, has the legal right to terminate its 
obligation not to refoule in such cases through “cessation”—
although it rarely applies this provision.
Need to Establish Temporary Status 
for Refugees in Canada
In like manner, there would seem to be good reason for 
requiring that all asylum seekers should be prepared to 
return to their countries of origin if the situation there 
improves within a reasonable period of time and they are no 
longer at risk if they go back. In 1999, for example, Canada 
along with other Western countries accepted thousands of 
Kosovars as refugees on the basis that they were considered 
in danger from Serbian armed forces in Kosovo. Later the 
same year an agreement was reached for the withdrawal of 
Serbian troops and the introduction of UN peacekeepers 
to maintain security and, in consequence, by June of 2000 
more than 800,000 Kosovars who had gone to other coun-
tries to fl ee the violence had returned home.
Most Western countries encouraged those on their ter-
ritory to do so and in some instances put pressure on them 
to this end. In the case of Australia, for example, 95 per 
cent of the 4,000 Kosovars who had been admitted as refu-
gees returned home. Canada, however, has no provision for 
granting temporary status for refugees and a large majority 
of Kosovars in this country chose to stay7—which should 
hardly come as a surprise considering the much better 
social services and economic prospects available to them 
here than in Kosovo.
In the circumstances, there is a strong case for creating 
temporary protection status for refugees fl eeing from areas 
where the situation is evolving and may improve in the 
foreseeable future to the extent that they can safely return. 
Other countries have such provisions and there is no reason 
why Canada should not.
As for the proposed legislation, even if it were approved 
by Parliament without major changes, it would be unlikely 
to reduce substantially the very large number of individuals 
making refugee claims in Canada. Relatively few, in fact, 
reach our soil in mass arrivals such as we saw in the case of 
the Sun Sea; most come individually or in small numbers 
and usually by air.
In addition, some asylum seekers have no need to employ 
human smugglers to enter Canada. Actor Randy Quaid and 
his wife, for example, as American citizens were simply able 
to cross the border legally from the United States in order 
to be able to claim refugee status—which they said they 
required because they were in danger from Hollywood “star 
whackers” and had been persecuted by American author-
ities for the past twenty years.
Canada Should Concentrate on Being a Country of 
Resettlement—Not of First Asylum
Th is leads to the question of whether Canada simply makes 
it too easy to make a refugee claim on our territory. In 
this respect, it is useful to recall that when Canada began 
accepting refugees in the wake of World War II it did not see 
itself as a country of fi rst asylum but rather as one that could 
make a contribution by resettling those who had sought 
refuge in other countries. Accordingly, we took in 186,000 
displaced persons from Europe in the years following the 
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war as well as signifi cant numbers aft er the Hungarian revo-
lution in 1956 and the uprising in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
We continued with this tradition in the case of Asians fl ee-
ing Uganda and Chileans in the early 1970s as well as with 
Indochinese boat people later in the decade.
Th e UN Refugee Convention Is Out of Date
We did not expect to become a signifi cant country of fi rst 
asylum since our geographic location made it unlikely that 
we would be the fi rst available country of refuge for someone 
fl eeing a regime that had been persecuting them. We never-
theless had doubts about whether the provisions of the 1951 
Convention would provide suitable terms of reference for 
Canadian refugee policy and did not, in the event, accede to 
it until 1969—by which time Canada had become so fi rmly 
committed to multilateral solutions to international prob-
lems that we found it increasingly diffi  cult not to sign on.
As events were to show, our reservations about acced-
ing to the Convention turned out to be justifi ed. Article 
33 stipulated that contracting states could not engage in 
“refoulement,” i.e. expelling or returning refugees to terri-
tories where their life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion. Th is article 
of the Convention was designed to protect individuals who 
were fl eeing across borders from repressive regimes from 
being forced back to where they came from–individuals, 
in eff ect, whose only chance to reach freedom was to take 
the route they did. Since Canada had no common borders 
with countries that persecuted its citizens, it did not seem 
likely that this provision would come into play very oft en 
in our case.
It did so only occasionally as, for example, during the 
Cold War when the Aerofl ot fl ight from Moscow to Havana 
stopped in Gander, Newfoundland, to refuel, and passen-
gers from Communist countries sometimes took the oppor-
tunity to claim refugee status in Canada. Th e prospect of 
large numbers being able to claim asylum in Canada under 
this provision, however, seemed remote. Most international 
fl ights into Canada departed from democratic countries 
where asylum seekers could apply for refugee status and 
where they were expected to do so according to generally 
accepted international rules. To continue on to make a claim 
somewhere else is considered “asylum shopping” because it 
involves trying to get to the countries that off er the most 
generous benefi ts. Such action indicates that the individual 
is more concerned about getting to a place where they can 
enjoy a better life than they are about reaching safety since 
they chose not to make a claim in the fi rst safe country they 
managed to reach.
Use of Human Smugglers by Asylum Seekers
In recent decades, nevertheless, asylum seekers have 
increasingly made use of the section of the Convention that 
makes it possible to claim refugee status on our territory 
and human smugglers have been active in facilitating their 
movement. According to the RCMP, between 1997 and 
2002, smugglers assisted almost 12 per cent of the 14,792 
improperly documented migrants who were intercepted in 
Canada or en route.8 Th is presumably referred to cases that 
had been clearly identifi ed as involving human smugglers 
and the real percentage may be much higher. One RCMP 
offi  cer as well as some immigration department offi  cials 
reportedly estimated that as many as 90 per cent of refugee 
claimants accepted by Canada between 1983 and 1995 got 
here with the assistance of human smugglers.9
One reason why the use of smugglers has become so 
widespread is very likely the fact that migrants attempting 
to enter countries without the proper authorization have 
had to resort to professional help to get around the increas-
ingly sophisticated control measures of governments. Th e 
imposition of visitor visas, introduction of documents that 
are diffi  cult to counterfeit, and presence of control offi  cers 
at airports have reduced the ability of amateurs to bypass 
controls and, thereby, increased the use of human smug-
glers with more professional skills and knowledge.
Canada’s popularity as a destination for asylum seekers 
is borne out by the number of claims made in this coun-
try compared to those made elsewhere. In recent years, for 
example, Canada has had by far the largest number of asy-
lum claims among the G8 major industrialized nations on 
a per capita basis even though we are the most diffi  cult to 
reach because of our geographic location.10
Our popularity is due to a combination of factors that 
include our high rates of acceptance, our readiness to con-
sider claims from citizens of any country in the world, our 
generous package of benefi ts, and the prospect that, even if 
one’s claim is turned down, the appeals and reviews avail-
able make it possible to stay in Canada for years and even 
decades, with a very good chance of never being made to 
leave.
Th e Charter of Rights and the Singh Decision
Th e long process oft en involved in arriving at the fi nal dis-
position of a claim has been complicated in particular by a 
decision of the Supreme Court in 1985 (known as the Singh 
decision) that allowed refugee claimants to receive the full 
benefi t of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Section 7 states, “Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.”
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Th is decision has played a major role in making it very 
diffi  cult for our refugee determination system to deal exped-
itiously with the large volume of people who make refugee 
claims in Canada. A former deputy minister of immigra-
tion, John L. Manion, warned when the Charter was still in 
draft  that Section 7 should apply only to Canadian citizens 
(or at least those with legal resident status in Canada) rather 
than to “everyone,” as otherwise it would grant rights to 
foreigners that would allow them to bypass or frustrate our 
immigration laws.11
As it turned out, Manion’s advice was ignored and the use 
of the term “everyone” in this section of the Charter made 
possible the 1985 decision which, in his words, “destroyed 
any real immigration control, and made Canada the laugh-
ing stock of the world, and the destination of too many foot-
loose criminals, terrorists and social parasites.” In terms of 
the number of applications, it is worth noting that in the 
six years prior to the Singh decision, 42,000 made refugee 
claims in Canada, while in the six years following the deci-
sion this number had ballooned to over 200,000, with close 
to three quarters of a million being made since 1985. While 
this matched to a considerable degree increases in the num-
ber of claims made in other Western countries, the Singh 
decision limited the scope of the Government’s response 
and made Canada a more attractive destination for asylum 
shoppers.
In a letter written in 1999 to the then minister of cit-
izenship and immigration, Manion recommended that 
the Government use the “notwithstanding” clause of the 
Charter to address the problems created by the Singh deci-
sion in terms of extending Charter rights to anyone seeking 
to remain in Canada. In Manion’s judgment, as a sovereign 
country, Canada must be in a position to make summary 
decisions in cases of those who have no legal connection to 
this country, as virtually every other country in the world 
does.
Manion, however, was not sanguine about the likeli-
hood of the Government invoking the “notwithstanding” 
clause for this purpose and, therefore, proposed at the very 
least that Canada formally cancel its accession to the UN 
Convention. In his view, Canada was very generous in the 
way it dealt with people fl eeing from persecution in repres-
sive countries and should continue with this tradition. By 
the same token, we should not be subject to international 
rules that were no longer relevant to current realities and 
should be free to develop our own policies for dealing with 
such situations as we saw fi t.
Criticism of the Refugee Convention
Manion has not been alone in criticizing the Convention. 
In 2001, British Home Secretary Jack Straw called for the 
redraft ing of international refugee rules because “people 
traffi  ckers” were eff ectively deciding who was coming to 
Britain and claiming refugee status. In 2000, Australian 
Immigration Minister Phillip Ruddock warned that the 
1951 Convention was out of date and being manipulated by 
people who were not genuine refugees. A paper prepared by 
the Australian Parliamentary Library provides one of the 
most comprehensive critiques of the Convention, noting 
that is “anachronistic” and “developed in and for a diff erent 
era.” It observes, “While Western countries’ asylum systems 
might have coped well enough until the end of the Cold 
War, they were not designed with today’s mass refugee out-
fl ows and migratory movements in mind.” Former British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair made similar observations in his 
memoirs published in September, 2009. In Blair’s view, the 
Convention, written in response to the horrors of World War 
II, had helped create a system that was completely unrealis-
tic in today’s world and utterly incapable of dealing with the 
massive number of asylum claims now being made.12
It is clear that provisions of the 1951 Convention are ill-
suited to the realities of today’s world. While the Convention 
draft ers envisaged relatively small numbers of people fl ee-
ing across borders from countries that were persecuting 
them and were seeking sanctuary in the fi rst safe country 
they could reach, we now are faced with having tens of 
thousands of people travelling great distances to reach the 
country that will give them the greatest benefi ts. In doing 
so, many if not most pass through or bypass other countries 
where they could have sought asylum. In a great many cases 
they do so with the aid of human smugglers.
Ideally, countries that accept refugees for permanent 
resettlement could together produce a new convention 
based on today’s realities. Reaching agreement on what 
should be included would almost certainly prove to be dif-
fi cult, however, because of the legal frameworks for deal-
ing with asylum seekers that have developed over the years 
in various countries as well as because of the infl uential 
domestic refugee advocacy lobbies that argue for ever more 
generous provisions for asylum seekers.
Canada Should Consider Withdrawing from the 
Refugee Convention
In the circumstances, it would be much more realistic for 
Canada to withdraw its accession to the UN Convention and 
create its own framework for dealing with asylum seekers. It 
could seek to do this in concert with other countries such 
as Australia that regard themselves primarily as countries of 
resettlement for refugees rather than of fi rst asylum.
Th ere is no question that were the Government to embark 
on such a course of action it would face strident opposition 
from a range of groups that have to date been able to play 
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a major role in determining our policy towards asylum 
refugee claimants. Th ese include immigration lawyers who 
have built careers around representing clients who are asy-
lum seekers as well as organizations such as the Canadian 
Council for Refugees and Amnesty International. All fre-
quently remind us that we have no choice but to let virtually 
anyone who wishes to do so come to Canada and have their 
refugee claims heard because of our “international obli-
gations” quite apart from the impact the Charter has had 
on the refugee determination system because of the Singh 
decision.
In addition to the problems created by the wording of the 
Charter that made possible the Singh decision and the out-
dated UN Convention, a particularly serious impediment 
to the creation of a workable and fair refugee determination 
system in Canada is our failure to make adequate use of safe 
third country13 provisions in determining who may make 
refugee claims in Canada.
Th e Need to Apply the Safe Th ird Country Principle 
More Robustly
Th e safe third country concept is based on the principle that, 
if someone fl ees their country of origin, they should seek 
sanctuary in the fi rst safe country they are able to reach. If, 
however, they choose to move on to somewhere else to seek 
asylum, it indicates that their primary concern was not to 
reach safety but rather to be allowed to seek asylum and 
remain permanently in countries where there are generous 
benefi ts, high rates of acceptance, etc. In this regard they are 
considered to be “asylum shoppers.”
When the legislation creating the Immigration and 
Refugee Board was draft ed in the late 1980s it was fully 
intended that that a list of safe third countries would be 
established in order that Canada not be inundated with asy-
lum shoppers and so that the refugee determination system 
would be able to process both expeditiously and thoroughly 
a relatively limited number of claims. In the event, the refu-
gee lobby was suffi  ciently infl uential that it was able to con-
vince the then minister of immigration that no other coun-
try in the world but Canada was safe for asylum seekers and 
none should, therefore, be designated as safe third countries 
(James Bissett has described in some detail how this came 
about14).
Since these events took place, Canada has concluded a 
Safe Th ird Country Agreement (STCA) with the United 
States under which asylum seekers must seek protection in 
the fi rst of the two countries where they have an opportun-
ity to do so, rather than, as in the past, being able to go to the 
mutual border and apply for refugee status in the other coun-
try. While this has led to complaints from refugee activists 
who argue that the United States is far too parsimonious15 
when it comes to granting asylum, signifi cant numbers of 
refugee claimants are still able to enter Canada at the US 
border if they qualify under one of the exceptions to the 
agreement.
Very clearly a key element in our being able to keep access 
to the refugee determination system to a manageable level is 
we must make more extensive use of the safe third country 
principle as do other Western countries. It makes no sense 
for us to cater to asylum shoppers who have arrived here 
via Britain, France, or other democratic countries that have 
good human rights records. Th is does not mean that some of 
them may not have a good case for claiming refugee status or 
that they should be prevented from making claims but sim-
ply that they must return to the safe country they travelled 
through en route to Canada to make their claims.
Th e Immigration and Refugee Protection Act stipulates 
that one of the factors to be considered in designating a 
country as a safe third is whether it is party to an agree-
ment with Canada for the purpose of sharing responsibil-
ity with respect to claims for refugee protection. Since IRPA 
only states that such an agreement will be a “consideration” 
rather than a mandatory requirement, we should be able to 
designate appropriate countries as safe thirds without hav-
ing to seek their concurrence. Should it be determined that 
the wording of IRPA means that having an agreement with 
another state is mandatory before it can be designated as 
a safe third, the legislation should be amended to remove 
such a requirement. We should also review the exceptions 
to the STCA with the United States since some of these are 
of questionable merit and should be eliminated.
Th e Refugee Determination System Requires a 
Complete Overhaul
Th e foregoing proposals do not constitute a comprehen-
sive list of the measures needed to correct a refugee system 
that has become highly dysfunctional over the years. In a 
paper published recently by the Frontier Centre for Public 
Policy, former Canadian ambassador and executive direc-
tor of the Canadian Immigration Service, James Bissett, 
makes the point that half measures will not work and fun-
damental changes have to be put in place.16 Th e same mes-
sage was conveyed in the Auditor General’s report in 1997 
that detailed a wide range of problems with the system and 
cautioning against attempts at patchwork modifi cations.17 
Th ere has, in the event, been little improvement since the 
report was released.
One of the most important changes that must be made 
to the system is to put in place measures that will discour-
age individuals from making refugee claims in Canada if 
they have an opportunity to seek asylum in other safe coun-
tries or else apply from abroad to come here as refugees. We 
 Reforming the Canadian Refugee Determination System 
115
would then once again be able to concentrate our eff orts on 
resettling refugees from overseas. We do, aft er all, reset-
tle more than 10,000 a year who apply from overseas and 
there are currently 42,000 waiting patiently in line to come 
to Canada through this channel.18 Why, therefore, should 
we give preference to those who have the resources to pay 
human smugglers in order to jump this queue? It can hardly 
be argued that coming to Canada constitutes their only 
chance to escape persecution when most of them could have 
sought asylum in countries much easier to reach.
Our System Is Extremely Costly and Unfair to 
Refugees Overseas
Th e current system is inequitable to those in need of protec-
tion in other ways as well. Th e cost to Canadians taxpayers 
of failed claimants alone is estimated to be in excess of $1 
billion a year—or $50,000 each.19 At the same time, how-
ever, Canada contributed only $45 million in 2009 to the 
UNHCR for the protection and assistance of the ten mil-
lion refugees under its care overseas—which amounts to 
about $4 each. Surely our priorities are skewed when this is 
allowed to happen.
A further possibility that should be considered to bring 
more order to the system is the imposition of an annual ceil-
ing on how many refugees we accept each year. Originally, 
we operated on an ad hoc basis; we accepted people as a 
particular crisis developed overseas—as was the case with 
the Hungarians, the Czechs, and subsequent refugee move-
ments. In order, presumably, to accommodate the planning 
of non-governmental organizations assisting in the resettle-
ment of refugees, we established annual targets.
We Need to Establish an Annual Limit on the 
Number of Refugees Accepted in Canada
We now, however, also have large fl ows of self-selected refu-
gee claimants arriving in Canada (a situation we did not 
anticipate in earlier days) in addition to both annual targets 
for resettlement and, on occasion, ad hoc responses to par-
ticular situations overseas—such as our agreement to accept 
5,000 refugees from Bhutan in 2007. In the circumstances, 
it would make sense to establish annual limits for the com-
bined totals entering through all of these channels. Canada 
is, aft er all, one of the most generous countries in the world 
when it comes to the acceptance of refugees from overseas 
and, in order to maintain public confi dence in the system, 
we should deal with overall numbers in a more orderly 
fashion.
Australia, by way of example, establishes the number of 
refugees it will take each year and this includes those reset-
tled from overseas as well as those accepted who have made 
claims onshore.20 Th e Australian total in recent years has 
ranged between 13,000 and 14,000. If larger numbers than 
expected come in through one channel, they are reduced in 
other areas to keep the overall intake within the established 
limits.
In Canada’s case, while there is widespread public sup-
port for taking in a reasonable number of genuine refugees, 
this would be better served if the numbers of successful 
refugee claimants who applied in Canada were combined 
with those resettled from abroad to produce an annual total.
Conclusions
Changing the way in which Canada deals with people who 
arrive on our territory and make refugee claims is both 
complicated and controversial and there is clearly a lack of 
public confi dence in the present system. It is open to wide-
spread abuse, unfair to genuine refugees waiting to come 
to Canada, extremely costly, and constrained by domestic 
and international legal obligations that are ill-fi tted to cur-
rent realities. It is also an area of concern in relation to pro-
tecting and preserving our sovereignty since we currently 
have limited control over who enters and remains on our 
territory if they claim refugee status.
Correcting the problems related to the refugee determin-
ation system poses an immense challenge to any govern-
ment given the array of individuals and organizations that 
oppose virtually every attempt to reform it that involves 
restricting access or reducing opportunities for failed 
claimants to prolong their stay in Canada. As noted above, 
some of the principal impediments to making fundamental 
improvements to the system include the 1985 Singh decision 
based on Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees, and our failure to establish an adequate list of 
safe third countries.
While there remains strong support in Canada for 
accepting genuine refugees, it is equally clear that most 
Canadian believe that the current system is not working 
properly and needs a major overhaul.21 Th e numbers of 
people attempting to enter Canada by any means available 
is only likely to increase in the future. Th e International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that in 2010 
there were 214 million international migrants and that at 
the current rate of growth this could reach 405 million by 
2050.22
While many of these migrants will be crossing borders 
legally, in its report the IOM expresses concern over the 
emerging patterns of irregular migration involving inter 
alia asylum seekers. It states that:
Current and future challenges of irregular migration result 
not only from increasing numbers. Irregular migration is also 
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becoming more complex, not just because of the variety of routes 
into irregularity, but also because of the diffi  culties in distinguish-
ing the particular needs and rights of various types of persons 
forming part of irregular migration fl ows—for example, asylum-
seekers or unaccompanied minors … Fundamentally, irregular 
migration should be curbed because it undermines the rule of law 
and exerts a heavy human toll on the migrants themselves. When 
destination countries tolerate high levels of irregular migration, 
they undermine their own legal immigration systems. Th ere is lit-
tle credibility for immigration law if migrants and migrant smug-
glers and human traffi  ckers are allowed to circumvent the policies 
in place to determine who enters, for what purposes, and for what 
period of time. Irregular migration also undermines public sup-
port for immigration. Oft en, the public reacts negatively to migra-
tion because it feels that the government no longer has control over 
who is to be admitted. High levels of irregular migration can thus 
create a backlash that extends to legal immigration as well.23
In the circumstances, Canada should put its house in order 
sooner rather than later and take steps to ensure that, while 
continuing to accept a reasonable number of genuine refu-
gees for resettlement, these should come essentially from 
among those who have been selected abroad and few from 
the ranks of those who make refugee claims in Canada.
Political parties that fail to recognize this state of aff airs 
can eventually expect to pay a price in terms of support at 
the ballot box.
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